Effects of Age and Income on Individual Health Insurance Premiums by Li, Jessie
Undergraduate Economic Review
Volume 7 | Issue 1 Article 14
2011
Effects of Age and Income on Individual Health
Insurance Premiums
Jessie Li
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, jessieli@alum.mit.edu
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Ames Library, the Andrew W. Mellon Center for Curricular and Faculty
Development, the Office of the Provost and the Office of the President. It has been accepted for inclusion in Digital Commons @ IWU by
the faculty at Illinois Wesleyan University. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@iwu.edu.
©Copyright is owned by the author of this document.
Recommended Citation
Li, Jessie (2011) "Effects of Age and Income on Individual Health Insurance Premiums," Undergraduate Economic Review:
Vol. 7: Iss. 1, Article 14.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol7/iss1/14
Effects of Age and Income on Individual Health Insurance Premiums
Abstract
This paper examines the effect of an individual's age and income on the premiums that she pays in the
individual (non-employer sponsored) health insurance market. After controlling for medical conditions,
insurance plan type, and demographic characteristics, it was found using both OLS and 2SLS that older and
wealthier people pay higher premiums than younger and less wealthy individuals, which raises the possibility
of adverse selection in the individual insurance market. These results may have important policy implications
for regulation in the individual health insurance market.
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1 Introduction
Over the past decade, health insurance premiums have been on the rise, and the percentage of uninsured
individuals has increased [Davis2007]. Furthermore, with the aging of the baby-boomer generation, the
demand for health services has increased, which brings up the question of whether the higher average age
of the US population would increase average health premiums charged by insurance companies [DAY2008].
Considering the recent debate over health care reform, it would also be interesting to examine whether there
is any correlation between a person’s income and the premiums that she pays. In an attempt to answer
some of these questions, this paper examines the effects of age and income on out-of-pocket premiums in
the individual (non-employer sponsored) health insurance market, while controlling for medical conditions,
demographic characteristics, and the insurance plan type. The hypothesis is that older and wealthier people
pay higher premiums, keeping other factors constant.
2 Background
Health care in America can be divided into roughly two categories. One category is called traditional
care (or fee-for-service), in which prices for health care rendered are determined solely between the physician
and the patient, and the role of the insurance company is simply to reimburse the physician for treatments
of acute illnesses or injuries. On the contrary, in managed care, the individual pays a monthly premium to
group of health providers in a managed care organization (MCO). In return, the MCO will negotiate deals
with a network of physicians to provide care at a lower price to the members of the organization, but with
certain restrictions on the number of times that the members can see the physicians. The MCO provides
coverage for primary and preventive care in addition to acute illnesses and injuries [Knight1998].
The managed care model provides more cost control than the traditional model by limiting the number of
unnecessary medical procedures prescribed by the physician. In the traditional care model, physicians have
a financial incentive to prescribe unnecessary medical procedures, leading to rising health care costs for the
patient [Knight1998]. In the managed care model, physicians need to maintain a good reputation in order to
remain in the network, and they are held accountable for their actions. When they enter into an agreement
with the MCO, they promise to reduce the per unit cost of services for members in the MCO and to limit
the number of unnecessary medical procedures. In return, the physicians usually receive compensation in
the form of capitation, in which the MCO prepays the physician for the treatment of the patient. This
compensation reduces the physician’s incentive to prescribe unnecessary procedures.
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Another way that managed care provides cost control is by limiting the types of physicians that patients
can visit at the cheaper price. In the traditional care model, patients can visit any physician they want, and
as long as their illness qualifies as an ”acute illness,” the insurance company would have to provide coverage.
On the contrary, the managed care model restricts the physicians that patients can visit to those physicians
in the network, if the patients would like the cheaper price. Doing so allows the MCO to keep costs down
since the MCO had already negotiated a lower price with the physicians in the network. Furthermore, in
some managed care plans, members must select a primary care provider (PCP) and always see the PCP
first before seeing any specialist. The rationale for selecting a PCP is that the PCP would first determine
whether it is necessary for the patient to see the more expensive specialist. If the PCP can handle the case
himself, the MCO would save on medical costs.
2.1 Types of Managed Care Organizations
There are three main types of managed care organizations: Health Management Organization (HMO),
Preferred Provider Organization (PPO), and Point of Service (POS). HMO is a type of MCO which offers
health care services to its members for a fixed monthly fee. HMOs offer two types of managed care plans,
closed-panel HMO and open-access HMO. Under the closed-panel HMO plan, patients are required to select
a primary care physician who must authorize the patient before he can receive any specialist treatment. Pa-
tients pay a minimal copayment for office visits, and the HMO covers hospitalizations in full [Knight1998]. In
the open-access HMO plan, patients have the option of seeing a specialist directly for a higher copayment. In
both closed-panel and open-access HMO plans, the HMO does not provide coverage for visits to physicians
outside the network.
PPOs are networks of doctors and health professionals that provide health services to individuals for a
negotiated fee [Knight1998]. In contrast to HMOs, PPOs do not restrict patients to seeing their primary
care provider first; patients can visit specialists without having to pay a higher copayment. Furthermore,
PPOs provide coverage to individuals seeking care from physicians not enrolled in the network, although
patients have to pay a high deductible and a high coinsurance.
A POS plan combines features of the HMO and the PPO plans. As in the HMO plan, the patient is
required to select a PCP who must authorize any visits to specialists. Like the PPO plan, the POS plan
provides out-of-network coverage at a high deductible and coinsurance rate.
Based on a study conducted by the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation and the Health Research and
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Educational Trust (HRET) in 2006, premiums for PPO plans are typically higher than premiums for POS
and HMO plans. One reason for the higher premiums is that PPO plans have less cost control since patients
can directly see specialists who usually charge more than primary care physicians [Claxton et al.2006]. POS
plans usually have higher premiums than HMO plans because POS plans partially cover out-of-network
visits, which are usually more expensive than in-network visits.
Compared to traditional care plans, managed care plans tend to have higher premiums because managed
care plans provide better coverage. Based on a 2005 survey by the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation and
the Health Research and Educational Trust (HRET), the average monthly premium for family coverage was
832 dollars for a traditional care plan, 871 for a HMO plan, 924 for a PPO plan, and 900 for a POS plan
[Gabel et al.2005]. PPO has the highest premium because it offers the flexibility of seeing a specialist before
seeing a primary care physician.
Studies have shown that managed care may have the problem of adverse selection, in which the managed
care organizations only allow healthy individuals to become members of the organization [Frank et al.2000].
When deciding what premiums to charge plan participants, managed care organizations have wide latitude
in determining individuals’ premiums. Factors that MCO’s consider include age, income, and preexisting
conditions. Although there are many different factors that contribute to a person’s health, one possible factor
is the person’s age. Insurance companies may think that older people are more likely to have illnesses and
therefore charge them higher premiums. To see if in fact older people do pay higher premiums, I examined
data on out-of-pocket premium costs for people in the individual (non-employer sponsored) insurance market.
3 Data
The data was collected from the National Health Interview Survey, an annual survey conducted by the
US Census Bureau on individual persons regarding their medical expenditures, personal health, and demo-
graphic characteristics. Cross-sectional individual data from the years 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008
were used for this paper. Health insurance variables of interest include the annual out-of-pocket premium
cost for the private insurance plan, the plan type such as HMO, PPO, POS, or fee-for-service, and whether
the plan was paid for individually or by the employer. Demographic characteristics include the individual’s
annual earnings, age, gender, race, education, and citizenship. Health status variables include whether the
individual has trouble walking or remembering and whether he is limited in any other way.
Because the individual’s income was reported as a number between 1 and 10, each corresponding to a
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specific income bracket, the values needed to be replaced with the national mean income in each bracket.
Data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey was used to determine the national mean income values.
Since over twenty variables for various medical conditions existed, adding all of the variables into the
regression would over-parameterize the model. Therefore, a principal component was created to provide a
weighted average of some medical conditions. Because many medical condition variables had a non-response
rate over 80%, using a principal component created out of those variables in the regressions would reduce
the degrees of freedom significantly. Therefore, only those medical conditions with response rates greater
than 50% were included in generating the principal component. The principal component used in this paper
combines the dummy variables for the following questions: does the person have trouble walking, does the
person have trouble remembering, and is the person limited in any other way?
Table 1 summarizes the variables used in analysis.
Table 1: Explanatory Variables
1
PREMIUM Annual out-of-pocket premium cost
AGE Age in number of years
Income Annual earnings
EDUCATION Number of years of schooling
USCITIZEN Dummy for whether the person is a US citizen
MALE Dummy for whether the person is male
HISPANIC Dummy for whether the person is hispanic
MEDICALCONDITION principal component for medical conditions
HMO Dummy for HMO plan
PPO Dummy for PPO plan
POS Dummy for POS plan
FEE Dummy for fee-for-service plan
OTHER Dummy for other plan
3.1 Empirical Specifications
First, ordinary least squares was used to regress log of out-of-pocket premium costs on log age, log income,
a variety of demographic characteristics, a principal component for medical conditions, and dummy variables
for plan type.
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The OLS specification is the following:
ln(PREMIUM) = β1 ln(AGE) + β2 ln(INCOME) + β3EDUCATION + β4USCITIZEN +
β5MALE + β6HISPANIC + β7MEDICALCONDITION + β8HMO +
β9PPO + β10POS + β11FEE + β12OTHER+ εi
The idea of this specification is to determine if older or wealthier people tend to pay higher premiums,
keeping medical conditions, plan type, and demographic characteristics constant. If they do, then either
the insurance companies could be charging them higher premiums, or the older or wealthier people could
be demanding good coverage plans with higher premiums. If it turns out that older people do not demand
plans with typically higher premiums, then it would be reasonable to assume that insurance companies are
charging older people higher premiums, which could signify an adverse selection problem.
After OLS was performed, 2SLS was performed on separate years of data and pooled data. The instru-
ments for income were a variable for whether the individual qualified for food stamps, a variable for whether
the individual received income from pensions, and a variable for whether the individual received social se-
curity or Rairoad Rewards. An overidentification test was performed to verify the exclusion restriction, and
a Hausman test was performed to test for errors in variables [Hausman1978].
Both OLS and 2SLS found that older and wealthier individuals pay higher premiums, keeping other vari-
ables constant. In order to test if older or wealthier people demand plans with higher premiums, a nested
logit regression was performed on the five different insurance plans: HMO, PPO, POS, fee-for-service, and
other. Figure 1 shows the nested logit tree structure.
HMO, PPO, and POS both fall under the category of managed care, while fee-for-service and other fall
under the category of traditional care. The case specific variables are income and age, and unfortunately,
there are no non-case specific variables due to lack of data on the individual plans. Nested logit regressions
using income and age as the top level variables were performed separately on each year.
4 Results
4.1 Separate Year OLS
Table 2 shows the OLS regression results for each year. As we can see, the coefficients on log income
and log age are positive and highly significant in all years, which suggests that wealthier and older people
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Figure 1: Nested Logit Tree for Choice of Different Insurance Plan Types
Table 2: Separate Year OLS Results, Dependent Variable: Log of Out-of-Pocket Premiums
Variable 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
ln(AGE)
.4204174
(.0581931)
.4151197
(.0622168)
.4538275
(.0752566)
.3900424
(.0664133)
.3581655
(.06177)
ln(INCOME)
.0415217
(.0176526)
.0557738
(.0166717)
.0305913
(.0166773)
.0387983
(.0171019)
.0535124
(.0187026)
EDUCATION
.0304392
(.0066975)
.0461535
(.007141)
.0466376
(.0086489)
.0311253
(.0088529)
.0235074
(.0065983)
USCITIZEN
.1221257
(.0972408)
.2999292
(.0954521)
.1211093
(.0926383)
.2544095
(.114078)
.3497774
(.0834037)
MALE
.0771887
(.0388674)
.0375758
(.0403688)
.1011693
(.0453056)
.0386174
(.0469243)
.071505
(.042062)
HISPANIC
−.2304746
(.0631677)
−.117611
(.0590579)
−.2036018
(.0824605)
−.1141885
(.0658442)
.0494393
(.0599691)
MEDICALCONDITION
−.0123592
(.0275418)
−.0046269
(.0141291)
.0448208
(.0206096)
.0251137
(.0292753)
.0196089
(.0248476)
dummy for hmo
.0879942
(.0718251)
.0748514
(.0694337)
.1457179
(.0740579)
.3420263
(.0914668)
.1525497
(.071746)
dummy for ppo
.3129684
(.0659825)
.1489021
(.063657)
.2489223
(.0675239)
.3720535
(.0837974)
.203056
(.0662049)
dummy for pos
.1790635
(.1591573)
.234418
(.1132297)
.139051
(.1766579)
.2061048
(.168013)
−.0768062
(.1348936)
dummy for fee for service
−.0075153
(.1151747)
−.0225754
(.1306332)
−.3068197
(.224515)
−.1012478
(.1565182)
−.1120505
(.1833302)
dummy for other
−.0245825
(.0868418)
−.0242369
(.0996339)
−.1191394
(.0973304)
−.1173949
(.1147397)
.1675383
(.0993519)
Numberof Observations 3068 2804 2184 2420 2658
R2 0.0662 0.0611 0.0740 0.0550 0.0425
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do in fact pay higher premiums. The large increase in premiums with age could be due to the fact that
elderly people are more prone to illnesses so the insurance company charges them higher premiums in order
to compensate for the risk that it is bearing.
Looking at the variable for education, we see that the coefficients for all years are positive and highly
significant, which suggests that better educated people pay higher premiums. This result is plausible because
better educated people may desire insurance of better quality so they choose the expensive health insurance
with extensive coverage.
US citizens also tend to pay higher premiums than non-US citizens, conditional on income, age, and
other characteristics being constant. A possible explanation for this finding is that US citizens have
faster wage growth than non-US citizens, which means that US citizens can afford better health insur-
ance [Bratsberg et al.2002].
The coefficient on the variable for male is positive but not significant in the years 2005 and 2007, which
suggests that the effect of gender on premiums is unclear. Although it is true that men on average earn
more than women, it is not necessarily the case that men prefer the insurance plans with the higher premiums.
The coefficient for the Hispanic dummy is negative and significant in all years except 2008. The negative
sign can perhaps be explained by the fact that Hispanic people on average earn less than non-Hispanics,
which suggests that Hispanics are less likely to pay for expensive health insurance [Reimers1983].
For the medical condition principal component, the coefficient is positive in the years 2006, 2007, and
2008, but negative in the years 2004 and 2005. However, the t-statistics for the coefficients are less than
one in all years except 2006, which suggests that health status does not seem to have a significant effect on
insurance premiums.
Examining the coefficients on the dummies for the plan types yields some interesting trends. The dummy
for the PPO plan has a positive coefficient that is significant at the 5% level for all years, which suggests
that PPO plan subscribers pay higher premiums than non-PPO subscribers, keeping other variables con-
stant. Also, it is interesting to note that the magnitudes of the PPO dummy coefficients are larger than the
magnitudes of the coefficients for the other managed care plans in all years. This suggests that PPO plans
charge higher premiums than HMO or POS plans to individuals with identical characteristics. This finding
is consistent with the fact that PPO plans incur the greatest costs for the insurance company since patients
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have the flexibility to see a specialist directly before consulting with a primary care physician.
When we look at the coefficients for the POS plan, we see that the coefficients are not significant, which
means we cannot conclude anything about whether POS plan subscribers pay higher premiums than non-
POS plan subscribers. Similarly, the coefficients of the fee-for-service dummy are not significant and neither
are the coefficients for the ”other” plan type dummy. Since ”other” encompasses different varieties of health
insurance, it is not surprising that there is no clear trend in premiums for that group.
The separate year regression results have shown us that wealthier and older people pay higher premiums,
conditional on other factors staying constant. Also, US citizens and non-Hispanics pay more for health
insurance than non-US citizens and Hispanics. Moreover, PPO plans typically charge the highest premiums
out of the three types of managed care plans, which is probably because the insurance company has the
hardest time with cost control in the PPO plan.
Since the coefficients on income and age do not differ by much over the years, it might be reasonable
to run a pooled regression and see if the same effects for income and age emerge. In order to determine if
pooled regression would produce the same results on age and income as the separate year regressions, we
need to determine if the coefficients on income and age stay the same across all years.
For this purpose, year dummies were created, and the data was pooled. During the pooling process,
income and premiums were deflated to 2008 dollars using the CPI for all urban consumers using all items.
Then, log income and log age were interacted against the year dummies for 2007, 2006, 2005, and 2004. The
following OLS regression was performed:
ln(PREMIUM) = β1 ln(AGE) + β2 ln(INCOME) + β3EDUCATION + β4USCITIZEN +
β5MALE + β6HISPANIC + β7MEDICALCONDITION + β8HMO +
β9PPO + β10POS + β11FEE + β12OTHER+
interaction terms between age and year +
interaction terms between income and year + εi
Then, a Chow test was performed on the null hypothesis that the coefficients for the interaction terms
are equal to zero. Jointly testing that the interaction terms are equal to zero is equivalent to testing that the
coefficients on income and age are the same across all years. The Chow-statistic with 8 degrees of freedom
in the numerator and 13109 degrees of freedom in the denominator from that test was equal to 0.28, which
corresponds to a p-value of 0.9714. Therefore, we cannot reject our null hypothesis that the coefficients for
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income and age are the same across all years. Pooling the data would thus give the same OLS results on
income and age as the separate year OLS regressions.
4.2 Pooled OLS Results
Table 3 shows the pooled OLS results.
As we can see, the pooled OLS coefficients for age and income are similar to the coefficients obtained in
the separate year OLS regressions. The coefficient for age is 0.40, which lies within the 0.35 and 0.45 range
for the separate year coefficients. Similarly, the coefficient for income (0.045) lies within the 0.03 to 0.06
range for the separate year coefficients. The coefficients on the other variables remain significant and retain
the same sign as in a majority of the separate year regressions.
4.3 2SLS Results
The OLS results have given support to the fact that older and wealthier people pay more for health
insurance, keeping other factors constant. However, the OLS specification may produce inconsistent estimates
in the presence of errors in variables. Since we only observe an individual’s income bracket instead of the
actual income, we suspect measurement error in the income variable, which will cause OLS income estimates
to be biased downward. In order to test for errors in variables, two stage least squares was performed on
each year’s of data using the following three instruments for income: FOODSTAMP which measures whether
the individual qualified for foodstamp programs, SSRR which measures whether the individual qualified for
social security or Railroad Rewards, and PENSION which measures whether the individual qualified for
pension programs. An overidentification test was performed to test a joint exclusion restriction that all of
the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term. Table 4 shows the 2SLS results for each year.
All the overidentification statistics are less than the chi-squared statistic with 2 degrees of freedom at
the 30% level, so therefore the exclusion restriction holds. Also, in the first stage regressions, the coefficients
on the instruments are significant, which indicates that the relevance condition is satisfied. Intuitively, it
makes sense for FOODSTAMP, PENSION, and SSRR to be correlated with income since whether or not
one receives foodstamps is correlated with one’s income. Similarly, whether or not people receive pensions
or social security depends on whether or not one has retired, which is correlated with one’s age and income,
but not the premiums that one pays.
If we compare Table 4 to Table 2, we see that the coefficients on income are greater in the 2SLS spec-
ification than in the OLS specification, which indicates the presence of measurement error in the income
variable. Interestingly, the age coefficient is smaller in the 2SLS specification than in the OLS specification,
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Table 3: Pooled OLS Results, Dependent variable: log of out-of-pocket premiums
Variable
(Standard Error)
Pooled OLS
ln(AGE)
.405053
(.0287427)
ln(INCOME)
.0446586
(.0078165)
EDUCATION
.0349317
(.003324)
USCITIZEN
.2353483
(.0433879)
MALE
.0608728
(.018999)
HISPANIC
−.1184009
(.0297783)
MEDICALCONDITION
.0125261
(.0107097)
dummy for hmo
.153905
(.0339851)
dummy for ppo
.2552552
(.0312121)
dummy for pos
.138467
(.0676477)
dummy for fee for service
−.0919594
(.071846)
dummy for other
−.0247504
(.0446242)
year2004
4.914516
(.1404129)
year2005
4.998325
(.1415235)
year2006
4.98287
(.1419267)
year2007
4.993465
(.1420729)
year2008
4.922989
(.141527)
Numberof Observations 13134
R2 0.9828
Income and Premiums were deflated to 2008 dollars using CPI for all items.
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Table 4: 2SLS Results for each year
Variable 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
ln(AGE)
.2270316
(.0672485)
.2570671
(.0690353)
.3073388
(.0796716)
.2292546
(.0788999)
.2269913
(.087212)
ln(INCOME)
.4715432
(.064938)
.4334326
(.0609526)
.4840748
(.0825295)
.3339356
(.0698639)
.2858897
(.1091581)
EDUCATION
−.0093745
(.0093035)
.0115651
(.0097041)
.003576
(.011818)
.003419
(.0108912)
.002331
(.0123945)
USCITIZEN
.1115718
(.0900009)
.2781028
(.0949033)
.0972838
(.1037401)
.1728524
(.0983807)
.291594
(.0928799)
MALE
−.176253
(.0560732)
−.2056726
(.0578194)
−.2053188
(.0745904)
−.1571799
(.0657968)
−.0743381
(.080502)
HISPANIC
−.3015365
(.0677656)
−.1999004
(.0731439)
−.2694939
(.0795579)
−.1990006
(.0769117)
.0039647
(.0697193)
MEDICALCONDITION
−.1031864
(.031579)
−.0480112
(.0222164)
.0038743
(.0292037)
−.0330214
(.0329017)
−.0330578
(.036995)
Dummy HMO
−.0721288
(.0783737)
−.0533092
(.0768556)
−.0881288
(.0970516)
.2397646
(.0874482)
.0587676
(.0892901)
Dummy PPO
.1737884
(.0744768)
.0673431
(.0702699)
.0135002
(.0917101)
.2764946
(.0802111)
.1265857
(.0802169)
Dummy POS
−.0024859
(.1385513)
.1127285
(.1384202)
−.0994332
(.1678121)
.2258198
(.1574213)
−.1047753
(.1392627)
Dummy FEE
.023998
(.1317011)
.1168527
(.1248004)
−.3527816
(.1506026)
−.069674
(.1563709)
−.0660702
(.1599011)
Dummy OTHER
−.002216
(.0974525)
.0274523
(.1057953)
−.0831459
(.1240865)
−.053187
(.121285)
.2611311
(.1240023)
Numberof Observations 3068 2804 2184 2420 2658
Overid Statistic .466826 .411061 .467722 1.38813 .573292
p-value 0.7918 0.8142 0.7915 0.4995 0.7508
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which suggests that some of the variation in the age coefficient was absorbed by the instruments. This makes
sense because PENSION and SSRR are positively correlated with age.
The coefficients on education lose their significance when we use 2SLS, which suggests that much of the
variation in education could be explained by the instruments. Once we include the instruments in the model,
the effect of education on premiums goes away.
The coefficients on citizenship remain positive and significant as in the OLS model, which confirms the
fact that keeping other factors constant, US citizens pay more for health insurance than non-US citizens.
Interestingly, the coefficient on male switches sign when we use IV, which suggests that the effect of
gender on premiums is indeterminate.
The coefficient on Hispanic remains negative and significant in all years except 2008, which confirms the
OLS result that Hispanics pay lower premiums, keeping other variables fixed.
The medical condition coefficient becomes negative and significant in years 2004, 2005, and 2007, and it is
insignificant in other years. A possible explanation for this effect is that the principal component variables of
whether the person has difficulty walking or remembering are not indicative of one’s health status. However,
due to the high non-response rates for other medical conditions, a tradeoff was made in favor of preserving
the number of degrees of freedom.
In order to verify that the OLS estimates are inconsistent, a Hausman test was performed on each year’s
OLS and 2SLS results [Hausman1978]. The Hausman statistics with 1 degree of freedom are shown in Table
5.
Table 5: Hausman Statistics for Test of Errors in Variables
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Hausman statistic with 1 degree of freedom 46.74 41.32 31.71 19.17 4.65
As we can see, all of the Hausman statistics are greater than the chi-squared statistics with one degree
of freedom, which means we reject the null hypothesis that OLS is consistent.
Next, 2SLS was performed on the pooled data using the same instruments. Table 6 compares the pooled
OLS and 2SLS results.
Since the overidentification statistic of 1.00 is less than the chi-squared statistic with two degrees of free-
dom at the 20% significance level, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the joint exclusion restriction
12
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Table 6: Pooled OLS and 2SLS: Dependent Variable: log premiums
Variable
(Standard Error)
Pooled OLS Pooled 2SLS
ln(AGE)
.405053
(.0287427)
.2372954
(.033888)
ln(INCOME)
.0446586
(.0078165)
.407034
(.0367217)
EDUCATION
.0349317
(.003324)
.0014867
(.0048946)
USCITIZEN
.2353483
(.0433879)
.1884017
(.0423754)
MALE
.0608728
(.018999)
−.1654679
(.0306198)
HISPANIC
−.1184009
(.0297783)
−.1922166
(.0326707)
MEDICALCONDITION
.0125261
(.0107097)
−.045
(.0131676)
dummy for hmo
.153905
(.0339851)
.0114374
(.0381438)
dummy for ppo
.2552552
(.0312121)
.132894
(.0352123)
dummy for pos
.138467
(.0676477)
.0409361
(.0656601)
dummy for fee for service
−.0919594
(.071846)
−.039643
(.0633929)
dummy for other
−.0247504
(.0446242)
.0330499
(.0498907)
year2004
4.914516
(.1404129)
−.077244
(.0316351)
year2005
4.998325
(.1415235)
.0064345
(.0322337)
year2006
4.98287
(.1419267)
5.145605
(.1411761)
year2007
4.993465
(.1420729)
.0222087
(.0333382)
year2008
4.922989
(.141527)
−.063389
(.0326214)
Numberof Observations 13134 13134
R2 0.9828 0.9826
Overid Statistic .999881
Hausman Statistic 6349.3504
Instruments: FOODSTAMP, PENSION, and SSRR
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holds, giving support to the validity of the instruments. The Hausman statistic of 6349 confirms the presence
of an errors in variables problem.
The OLS and 2SLS coefficients on US Citizen differ by about 20% but retain their sign and significance,
confirming the fact that US citizens pay more for health insurance than non-US citizens, keeping other factors
constant. The coefficient on the PPO dummy remains positive and significant between the two specifications,
confirming that PPO plans charge higher premiums than other plans.
By comparing the OLS and 2SLS results on year-by-year and pooled data, we have seen greater income
coefficients and smaller age coefficients in the 2SLS specification than in the OLS specification. Despite
the large differences in the magnitudes of the coefficients, they nevertheless remain positive no matter what
specification is used. It would be good to provide some explanation for why after keeping demographics and
indicators of potential health problems constant, older and wealthier people are likely to pay more for health
insurance than younger and poorer people. Two possible explanations exist. First, it is possible that older
and wealthier people are more risk averse and prefer the plans with the higher premiums, which usually
have better coverage than the plans with the lower premiums. Second, it is possible that adverse selection
is present, in which the insurance companies charge older people higher premiums because they believe that
older people are more prone to medical illnesses. In order to disentangle these two effects, a nested logit
regression was performed to determine if older people prefer managed care plans over traditional care plans.
If it turned out that older people prefer the more expensive managed care plans over traditional care plans,
then it is plausible that older people are choosing the plans with the higher premiums (perhaps because they
would like better coverage). But if it turned out that older people actually favored traditional care over man-
aged care but are still paying higher premiums, then it could be that adverse selection based on age is present.
4.4 Nested Logit Results
In order to determine the plans favored by the elderly and wealthy individuals, nested logit regression
was performed. Table 7 shows the nonnormalized nested logit results where income and age are case-specific
variables at the top level of the nested logit tree.
As we can see, the coefficient on the interaction term between income and traditional care is negative and
significant at the 1% level for all years. This strongly suggests that wealthier people prefer managed care
over traditional care. A possible explanation is that wealthier people desire plans that provide primary and
preventive care coverage in addition to coverage for severe illnesses since wealthier people may routinely visit
a physician for a regular checkup. Or it could be that wealthier people place more trust in the physicians
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Table 7: Nested Logit Results with Income and Age as Top level Variables
Variable
(standard error)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
dummy for hmo
1.383061
(20.97903)
1.467541
(.3298407)
1.414274
(.3806032)
1.61868
(11.87173)
1.71384
(.1187688)
dummy for ppo
1.786377
(20.97902)
2.055911
(.3289393)
2.020572
(.3795774)
2.315035
(11.8717)
2.434116
(.115598)
dummy for pos
−.9544614
(20.97927)
−.7203107
(.3454905)
−.7950022
(.3984572)
−.6262243
(11.8723)
−.4548043
(N/A)
dummy for fee for service
−.9080833
(.1196628)
−.4347192
(.1212794)
−.5632885
(.1418441)
−.7149679
(.1479859)
−.8244304
(.1588591)
traditional care * ln(age)
1.282378
(.1807629)
2.153326
(.2245949)
2.277842
(.2697607)
2.075714
(.2526602)
1.807026
(.2479094)
traditional care * ln(income)
−.2573889
(.0429034)
−.2501298
(.0454457)
−.2516521
(.0509986)
−.2276727
(.0512258)
−.3247668
(.0511939)
Numberof Observations 3068 2804 2184 2420 2658
that are part of the network of a managed care organization and therefore enroll in the managed care plans.
The coefficients for the interaction term between age and traditional care are positive and highly signifi-
cant across all years. This suggests that older people prefer traditional care over managed care. A possible
explanation is that older people may be accustomed to the traditional care plans that were popular in the
1980s and consequently decided to stay in the same plans that they had in their youth. Or, it could mean
that older people would like the traditional care plans with the better deals even if they do not provide as
good of coverage as the managed care plans.
Based on the nested logit results, we cannot say that adverse selection based on income exists because
wealthier people are choosing the more expensive managed care plans. However, it is possible that adverse
selection based on age exists because the older people prefer the less expensive traditional care plans, and
yet they are paying higher premiums than younger people, keeping medical conditions, income, and other
demographics constant.
4.5 Answers to possible objections
4.5.1 Omitted Variable: Regional differences in health care premiums
A possible argument is that regional differences in health care plans may contribute to the different
premiums that individuals face and that leaving out the regional effects might introduce bias if one of the
explanatory variables was correlated with the region variable. To test this argument, dummies for the four
regions (Northeast, Midwest, South, and West) were added into the pooled least squares regression. After
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adding in the dummies, coefficients on all variables retained the same sign, and their magnitudes did not
change by more than 15%. Therefore, omitting regional dummies from the specification should not be a
problem.
4.5.2 Variables for the principal component
Some may argue that the variables used to determine the principal component are not indicative of se-
rious medical conditions. It is true that the existence of any limitations in one’s ability to walk may not
necessarily indicate any serious medical problems. However, due to the high non-response rate for questions
on medical conditions, there was a tradeoff between degrees of freedom and quality of indicators of medical
conditions. In order to preserve a reasonably high number of degrees of freedom (2000 as opposed to 150),
only the variables with the highest response rates were used.
4.5.3 Heteroskedasticity
Initially, there were concerns over whether heteroskedasticity would be a problem because the White Test
performed on the least squares results rejected null hypothesis of homoskedasticity. However, when robust
standard errors were used, the p-values did not change by more than 15%, which suggests that heteroskedas-
ticity should not affect the results.
4.5.4 Conditional Logit
Some may wonder why the conditional logit was not used in determining the preferences of wealthy and
elderly people for managed care versus traditional care. The reason is that conditional logit regression relies
on the assumption of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, which means that individuals’ preferences
for a particular insurance plan should not depend on the other insurance plans. In order to test whether this
assumption was true, a Hausman-McFadden test was performed on an unrestricted and restricted conditional
logit model. In the restricted logit model, the HMO plan was dropped from the choice set. Table 8 shows
the Hausman statistics from that test.
Table 8: Hausman statistics for test of IIA
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Hausman statistic with 6 degrees of freedom -964.80138 -102.52895 -238.15736 332.04984 586.91815
As we can see, the Hausman statistics are either larger than their threshold chi-squared values, or they
are negative, suggesting that the asymptotic assumptions of the Hausman-McFadden test are not met. Since
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none of the statistics are positive and less than their threshold chi-squared values, we cannot say that the
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives assumption is satisfied. Therefore, it is better to use the nested logit
model which does not rely on the IIA assumption.
5 Conclusion
This paper has examined the effects of the purchaser’s age and income on her health insurance premiums
in the individual (non-employer sponsored) market. After OLS and 2SLS regressions were performed, highly
significant positive effects were found for both age and income when controlling for medical conditions,
plan type, and other demographic characteristics. These results confirm the original hypothesis that older
and wealthier people tend to pay higher premiums, after controlling for medical condition and demographics.
In an attempt to determine if the higher premiums are a result of adverse selection by the insurance
company or of demand for more expensive insurance plans by wealthier and older buyers, a nested logit
regression was performed to determine which plans were favored by wealthier and older individuals. It was
found that wealthier people favor the more expensive managed care plans, which provide better coverage;
this finding suggests that greater demand for managed care plans by wealthy individuals may be driving
up the premiums for these plans. It was also found that older people actually prefer the less expensive
traditional care plans over managed care plans, which suggests that adverse selection based on age may
exist because insurance companies are charging older people higher premiums even when they prefer the less
expensive plans. A possible explanation for this adverse selection effect is that insurance companies believe
older people are more prone to serious illnesses and therefore need to insure against the greater expected
losses by charging higher premiums.
The result of this study on the effects of age and income on out-of-pocket health insurance premiums in
the individual market has important implications in light of the aging baby-boomer generation. According
to the results of this study, as the average age of the US population increases, average premiums in the
individual market would also increase. Furthermore, the results showing the preferences of older individuals
for less expensive traditional care indicate the possibility of adverse selection based on age. The possible
existence of adverse selection should have important policy implications for deciding whether it is necessary
to have more governmental regulation in the individual health insurance industry.
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